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Corporate

Six clauses that decide who really controls a company

Shareholding percentages are the headline. Control usually lives in clauses most founders skim on the first read.

Two people agree to hold seventy and thirty per cent of a company. They assume the arithmetic settles the question of control. It rarely does. A shareholders' agreement, and the articles that give it teeth, can hand a thirty per cent holder a veto over almost every decision that matters — or leave a seventy per cent holder unable to sell without the other's consent.

These are the six places to look first.

1. Reserved matters

A list of decisions that cannot be taken without the affirmative vote of a particular shareholder or their nominee director. A short list — issuing shares, taking on debt above a threshold, changing the business — is normal and reasonable. A long one that reaches into hiring, budgets and ordinary purchases converts a minority stake into joint control. Read this list as if the relationship has already broken down.

2. Board composition and the casting vote

Who nominates how many directors, what makes a valid quorum, and whether the chairman has a second or casting vote. If a quorum requires the minority's nominee to attend, non-attendance becomes a veto by absence. Provisions for adjourned meetings with a lower quorum are the usual answer.

3. Transfer restrictions

A right of first refusal obliges a selling shareholder to offer shares to the others before going outside. A right of first offer works the other way round. Both slow a sale down; only one of them lets the other side match a third party's price. Whichever is chosen, the mechanics — notice period, valuation method, completion timeline — matter more than the label.

4. Tag-along and drag-along

Tag-along protects the minority: if the majority sells, the minority can join on the same terms. Drag-along protects the majority: it can compel the minority to sell into a clean exit. Most disputes over these clauses are about thresholds and price floors, not about the principle.

5. Anti-dilution and pre-emption

Whether existing shareholders must be offered new shares before outsiders, and what happens if a later round prices shares lower than an earlier one. Full-ratchet protection can wipe out a founder's stake in a down round; broad-based weighted average is the more common compromise.

6. Deadlock and exit

What happens when the shareholders simply cannot agree. Options run from a referral to nominated senior people, through buy-sell mechanisms where one side names a price and the other chooses to buy or sell at it, to a straightforward put option at a valuation formula. A shareholders' agreement without any deadlock provision is a plan to litigate.

One structural point. A shareholders' agreement binds the shareholders who signed it. To bind the company and third parties, the key provisions have to be carried into the articles of association. An agreement that contradicts the articles will usually lose.

None of this is exotic drafting. It is the ordinary architecture of a company with more than one owner, and it costs far less to settle at the start than to argue about later.

This note sets out general legal position and procedure. It is not legal advice, it does not account for your circumstances, and the law may have changed since it was written. Reading it does not create an advocate–client relationship.